The Six-Day War was not a war for territorial expansion

Some people believe the Six Day war was a war waged for territory. Anti-Zionist historian Avi Shlaim addressed these claims:

The speed and scale of Israel’s military victory led some observers to suspect that Israel launched the war not in self-defense but in order to expand its territory. Arab observers, in particular, were inclined to believe that Israel deliberately provoked the Six-Day War in order to fulfill its “long-standing territorial ambitions.” This view is without foundation. The Six-Day War was a defensive war. It was launched by Israel to safeguard its security, not to expand its territory. The main enemy was Egypt. The chief aims were to open the Straits of Tiran, to destroy the Egyptian army in Sinai, and to restore the deterrent power of the IDF. Political and territorial objectives were not defined by the government when it gave the IDF the order to strike. War aims emerged only in the course of the fighting in a confused and contradictory fashion.

— The Iron Wall, pages 257-258

Here, we lay the evidence for Israel’s claim of self-defense. Evidence that the Six-Day War was not a war for territorial expansion.

The Causes of The War

Egypt’s Expulsion of UN Peacekeepers

On May 16, 1967, Nasser demanded withdrawal of UN peacekeepers. At first, the United Nations interpreted the demand as one that didn’t require a complete withdrawal from Sinai, but only from strategic points along the border. In order to clarify, they had a few meetings with Egyptian officials. Despite that, it remained unclear what was the peacekeeping force demanded to do. On May 18, the Egyptian foreign minister, Mahmud Riad, clarified to the UN secretary-general (General U Thant) that “Egypt was determined to terminate the presence of the UNEF in Sinai and the Gaza strip.” General Thant quickly acceded to this demand, and UNEF withdrew by May 20-21. This withdrawal fatally undermined the order that had assured relative tranquility for a decade and posed a strategic threat to Israel.

Egypt’s Blockade of The Straits of Tiran

Around noon on May 22, Nasser announced that Egypt would close the Straits of Tiran to “all ships flying Israeli flags or carrying strategic materials” to Eilat. Those “strategic goods” included, amongst other things, oil shipments from Iran, which constituted 90% of Israel’s overall oil supply. The blockade prevented all oil shipments from arriving. This move was widely regarded by Israel as a casus belli an act or situation provoking or justifying war. It was seen as the “decisive act that made war inevitable.” Despite what some claim, this blockade was indeed actually enforced. On may 26, Oil shipment was diverted. On may 30, an American Oil tanker again tried to break the blockade and ignore Egyptian warnings. The Egyptians fired a warning shot, forcing it to leave. Project Herzl’s volunteers could not find one instance of oil shipment not being turned around.

Nasser, in his speech on May 29, went even further with this act that already justified war, and stated that the issue was Israel’s “existence,” not merely the Straits of Tiran.

Egypt’s Massive Troop Movements and Alliances

Starting May 14, Egyptian divisions, totaling approximately 100,000 troops with 800-900 tanks and over 700 artillery pieces, were moved to positions along the border with Israel (by 18 May, 70-80 troops, 600 tanks, multiple artilelry and airunits were already there). This unprecedented advancement represented a major strategic challenge and forced Israel to mobilize a lot of reserve units. Back in November 1966, Egypt entered into a bilateral defense treaty with Syria. Four days before Israel eventually decided to launch the war, Egypt signed a similar defense agreement with Jordan. Following the agreement, on the next day, Jordan allowed Iraqi troops to deploy in Jordan, creating a seemingly united Arab front against Israel.

The Economic Burden

Due to Egypt’s escalations, specially the massive deployment, Israel was forced to mobilize a large number reserve units, indefinitely disrupting its economy. In the Arab states, mobilization involves a tiny fraction of the labor force. In Israel, due to its much smaller population, one in four workers were mobilized and could not work. This colossal mobilization lasted for 16 days, counting from May 19 when Israel fully mobilized its reserves. It is needless to stress just how much strain and stress this placed on the Israeli economy, and as a consequence, on the government, to solve the situation.

So we know the causes of the war. But why did Nasser do this? Why did Nasser close the straits of Tiran? Why did he move his troops to Sinai?

Nasser’s Fault

On may 13, Egypt received false a false soviet report that Israel was massing troops (40,000 troops, and hundreds of tanks/artillery pieces) along Syria’s border. Other than the rejected Israeli invite to the soviet ambassador to come and see that there are no troops, Egypt’s president Nasser knew there were no troops. Several sources more trustable than the soviet told him so. Here are the sources:

Sources Telling Nasser That the Soviets Lied

The war from Nasser’s point of view

1. United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) reports: General Odd Bull, who was the Head of the UNTSO, issued a memorandum to the UN Secretary-General, U Thant, which unequivocally stated that there was no evidence of Israeli force concentrations on either side of the Israeli-Syrian border. UN Secretary-General U Thant said “Reports from UNTSO observers have confirmed the absence of troop concentrations and significant troop movements on both sides of the line”
2. American military intelligence: Lieutenant Commander L.P. Blasch, the American military attaché stationed in northern Israel, reported that “We have no reports, thus far, of any buildup.” Nasser knew about this report.
3. Egyptian Chief of Staff’s direct observation and report: General Mouhamad Fawzi, the Egyptian Chief of Staff, was sent to Damascus to verify persistent Syrian complaints about Israeli troop concentrations. Fawzi closely studied aerial photos of the border with Syrian Chief of Staff Ahmad Suweidani and personally surveyed the border and found no sign of IDF concentrations anywhere. He later recalled “I did not find any concrete evidence to support the information received. On the contrary, aerial photographs taken by Syrian reconnaissance on 12 and 13 May showed no change in normal [Israeli] military positions.” Upon his return, Fawzi reported directly to Nasser “There is nothing there. No massing of forces. Nothing.”
4. Chief of Egypt’s military intelligence assessment: Chief of Egypt’s military intelligence, Lt. Gen. Muhammad Ahmad Sadiq, who sent several Israeli Arabs to reconnoiter Northern Galilee said “There are no force concentrations. Nor is there justification, tactical or strategic, for such concentrations.”

So why did Nasser do it? Why did Nasser, knowing that the initial reports were incorrect, proceed with the mobilization and escalation?

Nasser’s motives

Nasser, is this you?

Egyptian officials hinted that Nasser’s true aim was to restore the pre-1956 status quo, particularly by evicting UNEF and remilitarizing Sinai. All of Nasser’s actions are attributed to a desire to reassert his leadership in the Arab world, regain prestige lost after the 1956 Suez Crisis, and address domestic challenges. Nasser was not reacting to soviet intelligence, but rather seized the opportunity provided by the false Soviet assessment. His mobilization into Sinai had nothing to do with Syrian security or Soviet intentions. High ranking military staff, including the Chief of General Staff (Fawzi) at the time agree that he exploited the Syrian-Israeli tensions as a pretext to launch a bold public relations gambit. Some interpretations even suggest Nasser aimed for a “grand propaganda victory” and early delivery of advanced Soviet weapons. His intervention in the Yemeni civil war had strained Egypt’s resources and reputation, contributing to an “existential crisis” at home that made a decisive move seem necessary. Finally, Nasser knew that closure of the straits of Tiran made war inevitable. In his biography, Sadat recalled Nasser telling the cabinet “Now with our concentrations in Sinai, the chances of war are fifty-fifty. But if we close the Strait, war will be a one hundred percent certainty”

No plan for territorial gain

Did Dayan just tell his soldiers to conquer Greater Israel?

Dayan’s Message to the Troops

On June 5, following the initial attack on the Egyptian air force, Defense minister Moshe Dayan told his troops that in contrast to the Egyptian war goals, the IDF had no aim of conquest:

The Egyptian General Murtagi, commander of the Arab forces in Sinai, had told his men that the world expectantly awaited the results of their “holy war” and called upon them to capture by force of arms and fraternal unity the “stolen land of Palestine”. We have no aims of conquest. Our purpose is to bring to nought the attempts of the Arab armies to conquer our land, and to break the ring of blockade and aggression which threatens us. Egypt has mobilized help from Syria, Jordan, and Iraq and has received their forces under her command. She has also been reinforced by army units from Kuwait to Algeria. They are more numerous than we; but we shall overcome them. We are a small nation, but strong; peace-loving, yet ready to fight for our lives and our country. Our civilians in the rear will no doubt suffer. But the supreme effort will be demanded of you, the troops, fighting in the air, on land, and on sea. Soldiers of the Israel Defense Forces, on this day our hopes and our security rest with you.

— Moshe Dayan address to troops

Strategic Objectives Against Egypt

The core Objective: Destruction of the Egyptian army in Sinai, which meant destruction of the fortifications in Rafa-Abu and Ageila-el-Arish, and to restore deterrent power of the IDF.

Dayan’s Shift in Sinai War Planning

Early plans included “Atzmon” (capture Gaza Strip and southern flank of El-Arish) and “Kardom” (capture eastern Sinai up to Jebel Libni), both aiming to hold territory until Egypt agreed to open the Straits. Dayan, upon becoming Defense Minister, expanded “Kardom” to include Sharm el-Sheikh and made the destruction of enemy forces the primary aim, changing the underlying conception from limited to total war. On June 2, Dayan gave his opinion in a cabinet meeting:

I said that we should launch a military attack without delay. If the Cabinet should make such a decision at its next scheduled session on Sunday, June 4, we should strike the next morning. The aim of our action should be to destroy the Egyptian forces concentrated in central Sinai. We should have no geographical aim whatsoever and we should not include the Gaza Strip in our fighting plans - unless, as was threatened, Iraqi troops entered and occupied it.

— Moshe Dayan speech to Cabinet, June 2

In a meeting, Dayan also instructed to not reach the Suez Canal, as it was an international waterway.

West Bank: From Tactical Response to Strategic Control

The decision to capture the West Bank evolved in stages, dictated by military developments rather than a political master plan. Initially, the IDF thrust into the West Bank without a clear plan for conquering the entire territory. After Israeli intelligence reported King Hussein ordered his troops to withdraw from the West Bank, the IDF’s objective was updated to “capture the West Bank and safeguard the descents to the Jordan.”

Attempts to avert war

Before the War — Jordan

Israel generally sought to avoid war with Jordan in 1967, prioritizing the Egyptian front and not wishing to get involved in a three-front war. There was a longstanding paradox in Israel’s relationship with Jordan, as Israel had an interest in Jordanian stability. Prior to the eruption of the Six-Day War, Israeli military planning and strategy were primarily geared towards a conflict with Egypt, with the IDF intending to remain on the defensive against Jordan and Syria until the Egyptian army had been destroyed.

Illustration of the Jordanian King’s behavior

Diplomatic Attempts — Jordan

The Israeli government, including Prime Minister Eshkol, made concerted efforts to prevent Jordanian military involvement. After the first They used various channels, including friendly states, the U.S. State Department, the British Foreign Office, and General Odd Bull in Jerusalem, to convey explicit assurances to King Hussein that Israel would abstain from any attack if Jordan and its government stayed out of the war. Prime Minister Eshkol communicated directly to King Hussein through General Bull, stating, “We shall not initiate any action whatsoever against Jordan. However, should Jordan open hostilities, we shall react with all our might, and the King will have to bear the full responsibility for all the consequences.” This effort was explicitly supported by Israel’s military authorities.

After The Beginning of The Bombardment

Israeli leaders initially considered Jordanian artillery fire on Jerusalem on June 5, 1967, as a “salvo to uphold Jordanian honor” rather than a full-scale offensive, and sent a second note to the King to desist.

Attempts Through Actions — Jordan

Independence Parade

The position in the requests and talks with Jordan reflected in a desire to respect existing agreements and avoid provocations, as was seen in the Israeli policies prior to the war. In may, the cabinet decided unanimously to keep the 1967 Independence Day parade (15 May) in Jerusalem strictly within the limits prescribed by the armistice agreement with Jordan, despite Jordanian violations, including denial of entry of Jews to the holiest site in Judaism.

After The Beginning of The Bombardment

After the beginning of Jordanian bombardment, not only did Israel send a second request to desist, but it also still had no intention of attacking the West Bank, and their deployment was purely defensive. Notably, no one in the cabinet or the general staff had proposed the capture of the Old City before the Jordanian bombardment began, and even then, Israel was reluctant to advance into the Holy Jewish areas. Defense Minister Dayan reportedly ordered a defensive approach, seeking to encircle Jerusalem without entering the Old City, saying ‘We don’t need that Vatican’. All troops in the area were there for defensive purposes exclusively and had strict orders to not take any act that could be considered “offensive” (not even patrol!).

When The Tides Turn, And Israel Decides to Attack Jordan

The Dire Situation

The situation for the Israelis had become dire. From the ridge near Government House, Jordanian troops had a clear path to sweep through southern Jerusalem—Talpiot, Katamon, and San Simon—and potentially join forces with units and tanks coming down from Mount Scopus in the north. The fall of the entire city was a real possibility. Meanwhile, on the West Bank, Iraq’s 8th Mechanized Brigade—bolstered by a Palestinian battalion—was advancing toward the Damiya Bridge, taking over the positions previously manned by the 40th Armored Brigade. With seven Jordanian brigades already in the area, the combined forces posed a serious threat of slicing Israel in two.

Israel Decides to Attack

But when the Jordanian shelling intensified, not only in Jerusalem but along the entire border, and when troops of the Jordanian army occupied UN headquarters at Government House, the former residence of British High Commissioners, the Israelis realized that the Jordanians were not just putting on a show, and the war began in earnest. That’s when Israel started attacking Jordan.

Syria

Rising Tensions on the Syrian Front

Following the Ba‘athist military coup in February 1966, a radical regime rose to power in Damascus. This government was even more extreme than its predecessors and pursued a doctrine of continuous warfare against Israel “day in and day out.” Syrian Defense Minister Hafez al-Assad exemplified this militant rhetoric, saying “We shall never call for, nor accept peace... We have resolved to drench this land with our blood, to oust you, aggressors, and throw you into the sea.”

Throughout 1966 and into 1967, Syrian artillery emplacements in the Golan Heights routinely shelled Israeli communities in the Galilee, including Dan, Dafna, and Sha‘ar Yishuv. A further Syrian advance of just five kilometers would have brought key Israeli roads to Safed and Haifa under threat, placing much of the Upper Galilee and Jordan Valley within artillery range. British officials acknowledged Syria’s “clear topographical advantage,” warning that Israeli kibbutzim were “sitting ducks” on the plains below Syrian gun positions, and that only large-scale action, or an air strike, could neutralize the threat.

As the situation deteriorated, Syria intensified shooting and mining activities against Israeli cultivation plots in the demilitarized zones. Employing tank fire and small arms, Syrian forces targeted Israeli tractors and foot patrols and even attempted to introduce shepherds and flocks into these areas to establish new facts on the ground. In two major incidents in January 1967, Israeli tanks destroyed three Syrian tanks during clashes. IDF Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin blamed Damascus for these escalations and accused it of severing communication channels with UNTSO, leaving little room for mediation. Rabin made clear that Israel would continue cultivating the contested lands despite Syrian aggression, which he interpreted as a deliberate attempt to destabilize the region.

Tensions on the Syrian front were fueled in part by disputes over water resources. Israel’s National Water Carrier, completed in 1964, diverted water from the Sea of Galilee to the Negev desert, an essential project for expanding Israeli agriculture and settlement in arid regions. Roughly half of the Jordan River’s waters come from the Banias and Hazbani rivers flowing from Syria and Lebanon, and the other half from the Dan River within Israel. Control over these sources was crucial; former Mekorot director and Prime Minister Levi Eshkol emphasized that without water, there could be no agriculture, and without agriculture, the Zionist vision for a sustainable Jewish state could not be realized.

Syria sought to undermine Israel’s vital water supply by attempting to divert the Jordan River’s headwaters within its territory. When Israeli patrols operated near Kibbutz Dan to protect water sources, Syrian forces opened fire, leading to repeated confrontations. These clashes escalated to artillery, tank fire, and ultimately Israeli air strikes. Syria’s aggressive actions over water resources significantly increased tensions and compelled Israel to defend its critical water infrastructure.

Support for Palestinian Guerrilla Activities

The radical Ba’athist regime openly advocated a “war of liberation” and actively supported Palestinian guerrilla activities and raids into Israel. Syrian leaders, including Dr. Nureddin al-Atassi, Syria’s figurehead president, Syria’s minister of defense, Hafez al Asad, and minister of propaganda, Mouhamed al Zuebi, publicly committed to a “popular war of liberation” to “destroy the Zionist entity” and expel the “Zionist invader.” The Syrian regime openly supported Fatah and other fedayeen groups, providing bases, training, and weapons.

The Syrian government publicly embraced and encouraged “sabotage operations and acts of terrorism, including the sowing of mines,” declaring them “legitimate activities” and asserting it had “no intention of doing anything to stop them.” On the contrary, Syria vowed to “encourage and promote all such action.” Syrian Prime Minister Yusuf Zuyin explicitly stated that Syria was “not the guardian of Israel’s security” and would “do nothing to prevent the Palestinian Liberation Movement from carrying out its activities.” Moreover, Zuyin warned, if Israel dared to take any action in response, Syria would turn the region into a battlefield.

Failed Diplomacy and Syrian Rejection of Restraint

Israel repeatedly turned to diplomatic channels in an effort to curb Syrian aggression. It appealed to the United Nations (UN) Mixed Armistice Commission (MAC) and to major powers, including the United States and Britain, seeking intervention to halt persistent Syrian shelling and infiltration. These appeals aimed to stop what Israel described as “incessant Syrian shelling” of kibbutzim and settlements in northern Galilee as well as guerrilla attacks and acts of sabotage originating from Syrian territory. Within a matter of months, Israel submitted approximately 120 complaints to the Security Council regarding these violations.

Israeli officials also pressed Britain and the United States to persuade UN Secretary-General U Thant to call on Syria to cease its provocations and urged the Great Powers to issue direct condemnations. Israel even requested that the Soviet Union restrain its Syrian allies.

Despite these efforts, Damascus not only refused to cooperate but escalated its stance. At a meeting of the Israeli-Syrian Mixed Armistice Committee (ISMAC), the Syrian delegation withdrew its earlier pledge to avoid hostile action, declaring it “could not and would not guarantee Israel’s security, particularly not against the Palestinian guerrillas.” Syria further demanded that Israeli forces evacuate the demilitarized zone and hand it over to Syrian control.

Israeli leaders later emphasized that war was not their first choice. Prime Minister Levi Eshkol insisted on exhausting diplomatic avenues, while Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin, summing up internal discussions, stated: “I want it to be recorded for history that, before acting, we did everything we could to find a diplomatic solution.”

Despite repeated appeals, diplomacy failed to restrain Syrian aggression. This failure, and Syria’s outright defiance, paved the way for a more dangerous phase: coordinated Arab mobilization.

Israeli Reluctance and Dayan’s Initial Opposition

Despite the gravity of Syrian aggression, Israeli leadership initially resisted escalating the conflict. Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, who assumed his post on June 1, 1967, was particularly opposed to launching an offensive against Syria. He warned that such a move could provoke Soviet intervention and result in heavy Israeli casualties. Dayan even suggested relocating ten Israeli settlements away from the border rather than attempting to redraw international boundaries through military force. Dayan insisted that Israel had “already [reluctantly] conquered enough Arab land and did not need any more.” Other ministers, including Zalman Aran, Haim Moshe Shapira, Zorach Warhaftig, and members of Mapam, shared this hesitation. Several even threatened to resign if the air force was used against Syria. His proposal to evacuate Israeli settlements was met with fury by other ministers. Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon and Prime Minister Levi Eshkol argued that such a move would be tantamount to “conceding parts of Israel [the settlements]” and would constitute a “greater victory for the Syrians.” This intense internal debate reveals that the eventual attack on the Golan was not a premeditated land grab, but the outcome of a reluctant and divisive decision-making process.

Ceasefire Violations and the Reversal of Policy

Illustration of Syrian stupidity

On June 8, Dayan continued to resist calls for an attack on Syria. However, events shifted rapidly that night. Egypt accepted a ceasefire, and Syria soon followed suit. Yet within four hours, Syrian forces had broken the ceasefire by shelling sixteen Israeli villages. Earlier, Dayan had stated that he would only approve military action if Syria violated a ceasefire. If the Syrians “continue shelling” despite Israeli restraint, he said, he would support an offensive “to take the entire Heights.” The renewed Syrian aggression fulfilled that condition. By the early morning of June 9, Israeli intelligence confirmed that Syrian defenses were collapsing and that the strategic town of Kuneitra had been abandoned. Confronted with this shift, Dayan reversed his position and ordered the ground assault on the Golan Heights.

Strategic Necessity of the Golan Offensive

From the top of the Golan ridge, Syrians had a perfect view of Israeli territory and excellent firing positions. This topographical advantage allowed them to easily and heavily shell Israeli kibbutzim. Although the General Staff had developed only limited contingency plans for Syria, Dayan expanded the campaign’s scope to ensure long-term security. The new objective was to push Syrian forces back twelve miles, to remove Israeli settlements from artillery range, by advancing toward Kuneitra and Rafid. Dayan and others emphasized that the assault was undertaken to “save our [Israel’s] settlements in northern Galilee from incessant Syrian shelling” and to demonstrate that Syria “could not continue to harass us [Israel] with impunity.” Israel’s capture of the Golan Heights was not conceived as a territorial expansion but as a response to enduring military threats. In this context, capturing the high ground of the Golan was understood as essential to protecting Israeli civilians and removing the topographical advantage that had allowed Syria to threaten them so persistently. Furthermore, the Golan was sparsely populated and dominated by military installations, which meant the strategic imperative could be achieved with minimal humanitarian cost.

Controversial Quotes

A comprehensive analysis of the quotes can be found here. We will only list the prominent ones:

Dayan: “We provoked Syria”

Here is the quote:

I know how at least 80% of the clashes there started. In my opinion, more than 80%, but let’s talk about 80%. It went this way: We would send a tractor to plow some area where it wasn’t possible to do anything, in the demilitarized area, and knew in advance that the Syrians would start to shoot. If they didn’t shoot, we would tell the tractor to advance farther, until in the end the Syrians would get annoyed and shoot. And then we would use artillery and later the air force also, and that’s how it was.

— Moshe Dayan

This relates to what is written above about Syria. Following the 1948 war, Israel and Syria agreed to have a demilitarized zone separating them. The quote allegedly comes from a private with Dayan, but there is no record of it. The agreement did not clarify who the demilitarized zones belong to, but only stated “restoration of routine civilian life”, and that there should be no military activity. Israel interpreted the provision for the “restoration of routine civilian life” in the DMZs as giving it the right to develop the zone, build settlements, and farm the land. Syria, conversely, argued that the status quo should be maintained under UN supervision until sovereignty was resolved. Both sides ended up asserting sovereignty. Dayan was became the minister of defense a few days before the Six-Day war. Prior to that, the only ministry he was the head of was agriculture, from which he resigned in 1964. In fact, at the time he is describing, he was not even in the government. How come he have known about such activities? Ultimately, what Dayan said or did not say does not change the historical record. Other than shelling Israeli villages, Syria has also been supporting and encouraging Fatah’s terror attacks, and that has nothing to do with shooting tractors. (all statements sourced above)

Begin: “We decided to attack him”

I thought the Illuminati decided to attack! This quote is revolutionary!

The 1982 quote usually appears as so:

The Egyptian army concentrations in the Sinai approaches do not prove that Nasser was really about to attack us. We must be honest with ourselves. We decided to attack him.

— Menachem Begin

The 1982 speech was not about the Six-Day war. Find the full speech here. Now see a few more parts of the speech:

We had three wars which we fought without an alternative. The first was the war of independence, which began on Nov. 30, 1947, and lasted until January 1949...The second war of no alternative was the Yom Kippur War and the war of attrition that preceded it...In June 1967, we again had a choice. The Egyptian Army concentrations in the Sinai approaches do not prove that Nasser was really about to attack us. We must be honest with ourselves. We decided to attack him. ‘Wars With No Alternative’.

He went on to saying:

This was a war of self-defense in the noblest sense of the term. The Government of National Unity then established decided unanimously: we will take the initiative and attack the enemy, drive him back, and thus assure the security of Israel and the future of the nation.

And if that is not enough to convince you that he did not mean that it was not self-defense, here is a comparison to a different war (in the same speech) that he said does not belong in the category of “no alternatives”:

As for Operation Peace for Galilee (First lebanon war), it does not really belong to the category of wars of no alternative. We could have gone on seeing our civilians injured in Metulla or Qiryat Shimona or Nahariya. We could have gone on counting those killed by explosive charges left in a Jerusalem supermarket, or a Petah Tikvah bus stop. All the orders to carry out these acts of murder and sabotage came from Beirut. Should we have reconciled ourselves to the ceaseless killing of civilians, even after the agreement ending hostilities reached last summer, which the terrorists interpreted as an agreement permitting them to strike at us from every side, besides southern Lebanon? Not One Month of Quiet.

See? so having your civilians routinely killed and injured has alternatives other than war, while the events of the Six-Day war left no option but to go for war. As he said in that speech with his own words: “This was a war of self-defense in the noblest sense of the term”

Reading the speech, I found another quote-worthy passage:

I - we - can already look beyond the fighting. It will soon be over, we hope, and then I believe, indeed I know, we will have a long period of peace.

Inshallah, Im Yirṣe Hashem, God willing, one day we will all live in peace.

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